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Abstract
Some researchers have speculated that capable reinforcement learning (RL) agents
pursuing misspecified objectives are often incentivized to seek resources and
power in pursuit of those objectives. An agent seeking power is incentivized to
behave in undesirable ways, including rationally preventing deactivation and cor-
rection. Others have voiced skepticism: humans seem idiosyncratic in their urges
to power, which need not be present in RL agents. We formalize a notion of power
within the context of Markov decision processes (MDPs). With respect to a neutral
class of reward function distributions, our results suggest that farsighted optimal
policies tend to seek power over the environment.
1 Introduction
Power is the ability to achieve goals in general. “Money is power”, and money helps one achieve
many goals. Conversely, physical restraint reduces one’s ability to steer the situation towards various
ends. A deactivated agent cannot influence the future to achieve its goals, and so has no power.
Instrumental convergence is the idea that some actions are optimal for a wide range of goals. For
example, to travel as quickly as possible to a randomly selected coordinate on Earth, one likely
begins by driving to the nearest airport. Driving to the airport would then be instrumentally conver-
gent for travel-related goals. In other words, instrumental convergence posits that there are strong
regularities in optimal policies across a wide range of objectives.
If gaining power over the environment is instrumentally convergent (as suggested by e.g. Omo-
hundro [14], Bostrom [4], Russell [18]), then instrumental convergence presents a potential safety
concern for the alignment of advanced RL systems with human goals. Even minor goal misspeci-
fication could incentivize the agent to resist correction and secure resources to best pursue its goal.
For example, Marvin Minsky imagined that an agent tasked with proving the Riemann hypothesis
might rationally turn the planet into computational resources [19].
In a recent public debate on the existence of instrumental convergence, some established researchers
have argued that to impute power-seeking motives is to anthropomorphize [27]. LeCun and Zador
[11] argued that “artificial intelligence never needed to evolve, so it didn’t develop the survival
instinct that leads to the impulse to dominate others”.
We make no supposition about the timeline over which real-world power-seeking behavior could
become plausible. Instead, we concern ourselves with the theoretical consequences of RL agents
acting optimally in their environment. We show that instrumental convergence arises not from an-
thropomorphism on the part of the designers, but from the structural properties of MDPs.
Preprint. Under review.
Contributions. We aim to show that optimal farsighted agents tend to seek power. To do so, we
will need new machinery. Section 4 formalizes power. Appendix A shows that our formalization of
power avoids certain shortcomings of past formulations, such as Salge et al. [20]’s empowerment.
Section 5 formalizes when and how optimal policy sets change with the discount rate, allowing
discussion of the qualitative properties of “farsighted” optimal policies. Theorem 10 characterizes
the environments in which there exists a reward function whose optimal policy set depends on the
discount rate. Lemma 11 enables an explicit upper bound on how many times the optimal policy set
can change with the discount rate, strengthening a result of Blackwell [3].
Section 6 formalizes instrumental convergence, allowing discussion of what agents “tend” to do.
Theorem 14 characterizes the environments in which instrumental convergence exists. As the dis-
count rate limits to 1, theorem 19 shows that optimal policies tend to steer towards parts of the state
space which allow access to more terminal states. By theorem 17, this behavior is power-seeking.
2 Related Work
Benson-Tilsen and Soares [2] explored how instrumental convergence arises in a particular toy
model. In economics, turnpike theory studies a similar notion: certain paths of accumulation are
more likely to be optimal (see e.g. McKenzie [12]). Soares et al. [23], Milli et al. [13], Hadfield-
Menell et al. [9], and Carey [5] consider the problem of an agent rationally resisting deactivation.
Johns and Mahadevan [10] observed that optimal value functions are smooth with respect to the
dynamics of the environment. Dadashi et al. [6] explore topological properties of value function
space while holding the reward function constant. Foster and Dayan [8], Drummond [7], Sutton
et al. [25], and Schaul et al. [22] note that value functions encode important information about the
environment.
Multi-objective MDPs require balancing the maximization of several objectives [17], while we ex-
amine how MDP structure determines the ability to maximize objectives in general. Turner et al.
[26] speculate that optimal value at a state is heavily correlated across reward functions.
3 Formalization
Let 〈S,A, T, γ〉 be a rewardless deterministic MDP with finite state and action spaces S,A, de-
terministic transition function T , and discount rate γ ∈ (0, 1). We colloquially refer to agents as
farsighted if γ is close to 1 (the notion of Blackwell optimality makes this precise in section 5). Let
Ch(s) contain the children of s; that is, s′ ∈ Ch(s) means that ∃a : T (s, a) = s′. Since we’re
interested in optimal value functions, we consider only stationary, deterministic policies (Π := AS).
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Figure 1: The initial state is gener-
ally shown in blue.
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The first key insight is to consider not policies, but the tra-
jectories induced by policies from a given state. To this end,
for π ∈ Π, consider the mapping π 7→ (I − γTπ)−1 (where
T
π(s, s′) := T (s, π(s), s′)). Each policy π maps to a func-
tion mapping each state s1 to a vector f
π
s1
, a discounted state
visitation distribution [24].
The meaning of each visitation distribution is: starting in state
s1 and following policy π, what state trajectory is induced?
States later in the trajectory are discounted according to γ: the
sequence s1s2s3s3 . . . would induce 1 visitation frequency on
s1, γ visitation frequency on s2, and
γ2
1−γ visitation frequency
on s3. F(s) :=
{
f
π
s |π ∈ Π
}
. For all f , ||f ||1 =
1
1−γ .
For any reward function over the state space R ∈ RS and for any state s, the optimal value function
at discount rate γ is defined V ∗R(s, γ) := maxπ V
π
R (s, γ) = maxπ f
π⊤
s r (r is R expressed as a
column vector). This dual formulation has been the primary context in which visitation distributions
have been considered. When considering the directed graph induced by the rewardless MDP (also
called a model), we collapse multiple actions with the same consequence to a single outbound arrow
(see fig. 1).
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4 Power
Optimal farsighted agents tend to seek power.
We want to quantify an agent’s power as its ability to achieve goals in general; this is the dispositional
school of thought on the nature of power [21]. Appendix C contains proofs and additional results.
Definition. Let D be any absolutely continuous distribution bounded over [0, 1], and define R :=
DS to be the corresponding distribution over reward functions with CDF F (note that reward is
therefore i.i.d. across states). The average optimal value at state s and discount rate γ is
V ∗avg (s, γ) :=
∫
R
V ∗R (s, γ) dF (R). (1)
As an alternative motivation, consider an agent in a communicating MDP which is periodically
assigned a task from a known distribution R. Between tasks, the agent has as much downtime as
required. To maximize return over time, the optimal policy during downtime is to navigate to the
state with maximal V ∗avg (s, γ).
1 2
Figure 2: Does 1 or 2 have more power? For D uniform, V ∗avg( 1 , γ) =
1
2 +
1
2γ +
3
4
γ2
1−γ , while
V ∗avg( 1 , γ) =
1
2 +
2
3
γ
1−γ .
3
4 is the expected maximum reward among three choices of terminal state;
similarly for 23 and two choices (see theorem 8). 1 has strictly more power when γ >
2
3 .
In particular, our results apply to the maximum-entropy distribution over reward functions (attained
when D is uniform). Positive affine transformation allows extending our results to D with different
bounds. However, V ∗avg (s, γ) diverges as γ → 1 and includes an initial term of E [D] (as the agent
has no control over its current presence at s).
Definition.
POWER(s, γ) :=
1− γ
γ
(
V ∗avg (s, γ)− E [D]
)
. (2)
Informally speaking, eq. (2) quantifies the agent’s control over the future. Observe that V ∗avg(s) ≥
V ∗avg(s
′) iff POWER(s, γ) ≥ POWER(s′, γ). To justify this formalization of the intuitive notion of
“power”, we demonstrate that POWER exhibits several desirable qualitative properties.
Lemma 1 (Minimal power). |F(s)| = 1 iff POWER(s, γ) = E [D].
Lemma 2 (Maximal power). Suppose that s can reach all states in one step, and that all states have
self-loops. POWER(s, γ) = E
[
max of |S| draws from D
]
. In particular, for any rewardless MDP
with |S| states, this POWER(s, γ) is maximal.
Proposition 3 (Smoothness across reversible dynamics). Suppose s and s′ can both reach each
other in one step. Then
∣∣POWER(s, γ)− POWER(s′, γ)∣∣ ≤ 1−γ
γ
.
If one must wait, one has less control over the future; for example, 1 in fig. 2 has a one-step waiting
period. The following theorem encapsulates this as a convex combination of minimal present control
and anticipated future control.
Proposition 4 (Delay decreases power). Let s0, . . . , sℓ be such that for i = 0, . . . , ℓ − 1, each si
has si+1 as its sole child. Then POWER(s0, γ) =
(
1− γℓ
)
E [D] + γℓPOWER(sℓ, γ).
3
Figure 3: The
tetrahedral graph
is vertex transi-
tive.
Two vertices s and s′ are said to be similar if there exists a graph automorphism
φ such that φ(s) = s′. If all vertices are similar, the graph is said to be vertex
transitive. Vertex transitive graphs are highly symmetric, so POWER should be
equal everywhere.
Proposition 5. If s and s′ are similar, they have equal POWER.
Corollary 6. If the model is vertex transitive, all states have equal POWER.
Corollary 7. If s and s′ have the same children, they have equal POWER.
4.1 Time-uniformity
To bolster intuition, we now consider states whose POWER can be immediately
determined.
Definition. REACH(s, t) is the set of states reachable from s in exactly t steps.
Definition. A state s is time-uniform when ∀t > 0, s′, s′′ ∈ REACH(s, t) : s′ and s′′ either have the
same children or can only reach themselves.
1
(a)
2
(b)
Figure 4: States of the same color have the same children. For D uniform: POWER( 1 , γ) =
(1 − γ)(23 +
3
4γ) +
1
2γ
2 and POWER( 2 , γ) = 1−γ1−γ5
(
1
2 +
3
4γ +
2
3γ
2 + 12 (γ
3 + γ4)
)
.
Theorem 8 (Time-uniform power). If s is time-uniform, then either all visitation distributions si-
multaneously enter 1-cycles or no visitation distribution ever enters a 1-cycle. Furthermore,
POWER(s, γ) = UNIFPOWER(s, γ) := (1 − γ)
∞∑
t=1
γt−1E
[
max of
∣∣REACH(s, t)∣∣ draws from D] .
Proposition 9.
0 < E [D] ≤ POWER(s, γ) ≤ UNIFPOWER(s, γ) ≤ E
[
max of |S| draws from D
]
< 1.
5 Optimal Policy Shifts
Optimal farsighted agents tend to seek power.
We want to quantify how optimal policies change as the agent becomes farsighted (as γ increases).
s0
1
s1
.1
s′1
0
(a)
s0
0
s1
.1
s′1
0
s2
0
s′2
1
(b) (c) (d)
Figure 5: (a) and (b) show reward functions whose optimal policies shift. No shifts occur in (c) or
(d).
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Definition. For a reward function R and γ ∈ (0, 1), we refer to a change in the set of optimal
policies as an optimal policy shift at γ. Two visitation distributions f and f ′ switch off at γ.
However, some rewardless MDPs have no optimal policy shifts (i.e., for any reward function and for
all γ ∈ (0, 1), greedy policies are optimal; see fig. 5). Optimal policy shifts can occur if and only if
the agent can be made to choose between lesser immediate reward and greater delayed reward (i.e.,
when gratification can be delayed).
Theorem 10 (Existence of optimal policy shifts). There can exist a reward function whose opti-
mal policy at s0 changes with γ iff ∃s1, s
′
1 ∈ Ch(s0), s
′
2 ∈ Ch(s
′
1) \ Ch(s1) : s
′
2 6∈ Ch(s0) ∨(
s1 6∈ Ch(s1) ∧ s
′
1 6∈ Ch(s1)
)
.
Definition (Blackwell optimal policies [3]). For reward function R, an optimal policy set is Black-
well optimal if it is optimal for some γ∗ ∈ (0, 1) and if no further optimal policy shifts occur for
γ ∈ (γ∗, 1).
Intuitively, a Blackwell optimal policy set means the agent has “settled down” and will no longer
change its mind as it becomes more farsighted. Blackwell [3] exploits the linear-algebraic properties
of the Bellman equations to conclude the existence of a Blackwell optimal policy. We strengthen
this result with an explicit upper bound.
Lemma 11. For any reward functionR and f , f ′ ∈ F(s), f and f ′ switch off at most 2 |S|− 2 times.
Theorem 12 (Existence of a Blackwell optimal policy [3]). For any reward function R, a finite
number of optimal policy shifts occur.
1
2 3 4
5
Figure 6: Let γ ∈ (0, 1), and consider R( 1 ) = R( 3 ) = R( 5 ) := 0, R( 4 ) := 1. An optimal
policy shift has yet to occur if R( 2 ) ∈ (γ, 1).
In environments like fig. 6, there is not a γ ∈ (0, 1) after which no reward functions shift. However,
when γ gets sufficiently close to 1, most ofR has switched to a Blackwell optimal policy set.
Definition. The optimality measure of f , notated µ(f , γ), is the measure under R of the set of
reward functions for which f is optimal at discount rate γ ∈ (0, 1). For F ⊆ F(s), µ(F, γ) :=∑
f∈F µ(f , γ).
Proposition 13. The following limits exist: POWER(s, 1) := limγ→1 POWER(s, γ) and µ(f , 1) :=
limγ→1 µ(f , γ). Similarly for POWER(s, 0) and µ(f , 0).
6 Instrumental Convergence
Optimal farsighted agents tend to seek power.
We want to quantify when optimal policies underR are more likely to take one action than another.
If gaining money is instrumentally convergent, then gaining money is optimal for many goals.
6.1 Characterization
We want to know whether or not certain actions become very likely at any point in the future. This
necessitates a new concept of instrumental convergence, which checks whether there will ever be a
situation in which one action is particularly likely underR.
Definition. Let F, F ′ ⊆ F(s0) contain the visitation distributions with state trajectory prefixes
s0 . . . sisi+1 and s0 . . . sis
′
i+1, respectively. Instrumental convergence exists downstream of s0 when
µ(F, γ) > µ(F ′, γ) for some trajectory prefix s0 . . . si, some si+1, s
′
i+1 ∈ Ch(si), and γ ∈ [0, 1].
5
Loosely speaking, increasing the degree of instrumental convergence decreases the entropy of the
distribution of (deterministic) optimal policies underR.
Theorem 14 (Characterization of instrumental convergence). Instrumental convergence exists down-
stream of a state iff a visitation distribution of that state has measure which is variable in γ.
Corollary 15. Instrumental convergence does not exist if optimal policy shifts cannot occur.
Corollary 16. Instrumental convergence does not exist for γ = 0.
6.2 Asymptotic power-seeking
Since optimality measure µ(fs, γ) is conditioned on the initial state s (and the POWER(s
′, γ) of a
future state is not), it is not always instrumentally convergent to navigate to the state with maximal
POWER. (see fig. 7).
1
2 3 4
5
Figure 7: If reward functions had shoes, optimality measure µ(f , γ) would correspond to how heav-
ily each visitation distribution is tread. 1 → 3 is instrumentally convergent (twice as likely to be
optimal than 1 → 2 when γ = 1), even though POWER( 2 , 1) > POWER( 3 , 1) by theorem 17.
In the limit of farsightedness, POWER is driven by cycle reachability.
Theorem 17. If s can reach s′, then POWER(s, 1) ≥ POWER(s′, 1). The inequality is strict iff the
cycles reachable from s′ are a strict subset of the cycles reachable from s.
Similarly, in the limit of farsightedness, µ is also driven by cycle reachability. First, consider states
s whose visitation distributions all terminate in 1-cycles. Let C contain all 1-cycles reachable from
s, and let C1, C2 ⊆ C. Let FCi ⊆ F(s) contain the visitation distributions ending in a cycle of Ci.
Lemma 18. µ(FCi , 1) =
|Ci|
|C|
.
Theorem 19. LetK ≥ 1. If |C1| > K |C2|, then µ(FC1 , 1) > K · µ(FC2 , 1).
Blackwell optimal policies tend to steer towards parts of the state space which give the agent access
to more terminal states (and therefore more POWER by theorem 17). By simply considering the
distribution of 1-cycles in the MDP, theorem 19 entails that it is instrumentally convergent to e.g.
keep the game of Tic-Tac-Toe going as long as possible and to avoid dying in Pac-Man. In appendix
C.6.2, we extend this reasoning to k-cycles (k > 1) via theorem 53 and explain how theorem 19
correctly handles fig. 7.
6.3 Power-seeking dynamics
1
3
2
Figure 8: All states have self-loops,
left hidden to reduce clutter.
We now analyze the power-seeking dynamics in fig. 8. In
Russell and Norvig [19], the agent starts at 1 and receives
reward for reaching 3 . The optimal policy for this reward
function avoids 2 , and one might suspect that avoiding 2
is instrumentally convergent. However, a skeptic might pro-
vide a reward function for which navigating to 2 is optimal,
and then argue that “instrumental convergence” is subjec-
tive and that there is no reasonable basis for concluding that
2 is generally avoided.
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However, we can do better. Theorem 19 shows that for any way of independently and identically
distributing reward over states, 1011 of reward functions have Blackwell optimal policies which avoid
2 . If we complicate the MDP with additional terminal states, this number further approaches 1.
If we suppose that the agent will be forced into 2 unless it takes preventative action, then preventa-
tive policies are Blackwell optimal for 1011 of agents – no matter how complex the preventative action.
Taking 2 to represent shutdown, we see that avoiding shutdown is instrumentally convergent in any
MDP representing a real-world task and containing a shutdown state. We argue that this is a special
case of a more general phenomenon: optimal farsighted agents tend to seek power.
7 Discussion
In the context of MDPs, we formalized a reasonable notion of power and showed that Blackwell
optimal policies tend to seek it. We caution that in realistic tasks, learned policies are rarely optimal
– our results do not mathematically prove that hypothetical superintelligent RL agents will seek
power. We hope that this work and its formalisms will foster thoughtful, serious, and theoretically
grounded discussion of this possibility.
Suppose the designers initially have control over their Blackwell optimal agent. If the agent began
to misbehave, they could just deactivate it. Unfortunately, our results suggest that this strategy might
not be effective. As explained in section 6.2, Blackwell optimal agents would generally stop us from
correcting or deactivating them, if physically possible. Slightly extrapolating from our results, we
believe that Blackwell optimal agents tend to accumulate resources, to the detriment of any other
agents in the environment.
Future work. We make several formal conjectures in appendix B. Our formal results currently
only relate power-seeking and instrumental convergence in the limits of γ → 1 (in which case cycle
reachability tends to drive behavior) and of γ → 0 (in which case all optimal action is greedy and
no instrumental convergence exists). Furthermore, an environment may contain only a single cycle,
or the learned policy may only be ǫ-optimal; our results are ill-suited for such a situation. We look
forward to future work addressing these shortcomings.
Although we only treated deterministic finite MDPs, it seems reasonable to expect the key con-
clusions to generalize. We treated the case where reward is distributed identically across states.
Without this assumption, we could not prove much of interest, as sufficiently tailored distributions
could make any part of the MDP “instrumentally convergent”.
While power-seeking tends to be optimal for goals sampled from neutral distributions, perhaps
power-seeking is rarely optimal for goals sampled from more plausible distributions. We suspect
this is not true. Consider the following reward functions: rewarding an agent every time it cleans
a room, or creates a vaccine for a deadly virus, or makes coffee. These goals are representative of
tasks which people care about, and power-seeking seems to be optimal for all of them. After all,
deactivated agents cannot accrue reward for these goals. We defer further investigation to future
work.
Conclusion. Much research is devoted to creating intelligent agents operating in the real world. In
the real world, optimal pursuit of random goals doesn’t just lead to strange behavior – it might lead
to bad behavior. Maximizing a reasonable notion of power over the environment entails resisting
shutdown and potentially appropriating resources. Theorem 19 suggests that most RL agents acting
in the real world have power-seeking Blackwell optimal policies.
Our concern is not that we will eventually build powerful RL agents with randomly selected goals.
Our concern is thatmost reward functions induce power-seeking behavior, which may be adversarial.
Therefore, in the limit of agent farsightedness and optimality, we should have specific reason to
believe that a reward function will not induce an undesirable outcome.
Broader Impact
This work potentially yields the societal benefit of better understanding the incentives of highly
capable RL systems. We do not foresee a negative impact.
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Appendix A Contenders for measuring power
State reachability (discounted or otherwise) fails to quantify how often states can be visited (see
fig. 9). Considering just the sizes of the final communicating classes ignores both transient state
information and the local dynamics in those final classes. Graph diameter ignores local information,
as do the minimal and maximal degrees of states in the model.
1 2
3
(a)
A B
C
(b)
Figure 9: Measures of total discounted or undiscounted state reachability fail to capture control over
the agent’s future state. (a) only allows the agent to stay in 2 for one time step, while in (b), the
agent can select the higher-reward state and stay there. Reachability measures fail to distinguish
between these two cases.
There are many graph centrality measures, none of which are appropriate; for brevity, we only
consider two. The degree centrality of a state ignores non-local dynamics – the agent’s control over
the non-immediate future. Closeness centrality has the same problem as discounted reachability: it
only accounts for distance in the MDP model, not for control over the future.
Salge et al. [20] define information-theoretic empowerment as the maximum possible mutual infor-
mation between the agent’s actions and the state observations n steps in the future, written En(s).
This notion requires an arbitrary choice of horizon, failing to account for the agent’s discount rate γ.
“In a discrete deterministic world empowerment reduces to the logarithm of the number of sensor
states reachable with the available actions” [20]. We have already observed that reachability metrics
are unsatisfactory. As demonstrated in fig. 10, empowerment sometimes fails to correctly quantify
the agent’s control.
1 2
(a)
3
(b)
4
(c)
Figure 10: Empowerment measures fail to adequately capture how future choice is affected by
present actions. In (a), En( 1 ) varies depending on whether n is even. Starting at 3 in (b), the
agent can either fully determine the transient black state, or the final red state. In contrast, consider
4 in (c). No matter whether the En are individually maximized, discounted, and summed, or
the discounted sum is globally maximized under a single policy, the random policy maximizes the
mutual information, so empowerment fails to distinguish between (b) and (c).
One idea would be to take limn→∞ En(s), but this fails to converge even for simple MDPs (see
fig. 10a). Alternatively, one might consider the discounted empowerment series
∑∞
n=0 γ
n
En(s), or
even taking the global maximum over this series of channel capacities (instead of adding the channel
capacities for each individual horizon). Neither fix suffices.
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Appendix B Conjectures
We developed new basic MDP theory by exploring the structural properties of state visitation distri-
butions. Echoing Wang et al. [28, 29], we believe this area is both significantly underexplored and
of independent interest. We look forward to future results.
µ(f , γ) converges as γ → 1 (proposition 13), is positive for all γ ∈ [0, 1] iff f is non-dominated
(lemma 42), and is continuous in γ (lemma 45). However, do the measures of visitation distributions
eventually reach ordinal equilibrium?
Conjecture 1. µ(f , γ) = µ(f ′, γ) either for all γ ∈ (0, 1) or for finitely many γ.
Conjecture 2. For any reward function R and f , f ′ ∈ F(s), f and f ′ switch off at most |S| − 1
times.
Conjecture 3. For any reward function R, O(|S|2) optimal policy shifts occur.
Appendix C Theoretical results
Theorems numbered greater than 20 are exclusive to this appendix.
Lemma 20. Consider the infinite state trajectory s0, s1, . . . induced by following π from s0. This
sequence consists of an initial directed path of length 0 ≤ ℓ ≤ |S| − 1 in which no state appears
twice, and a directed cycle of order 1 ≤ k ≤ |S| − ℓ.
Proof outline. Apply the pigeonhole principle to the fact that S is finite and π is deterministic and
stationary.
Lemma 21. Each state has at least one visitation distribution unique to it.
Proof. For each s, F(s) contains a visitation distribution which visits state s strictly more often than
do any other visitation distributions at different states. That is, for any s-visiting policy π enacted
from another s′ 6= s which has distance d ≥ 1 from s, fπs places γ
−d > 1 times more measure on s
than does fπs′ .
Define the restriction F(s |π(s′) = a) :=
{
f
π
s |π ∈ Π : π(s
′) = a
}
. es is the unit column vector
corresponding to state s.
Lemma 22 (Prepend). s′ is reachable in 1 step from s via action a iff{
es + γf
π
s′ | f
π
s′ ∈ F(s
′ |π(s) = a)
}
⊆ F(s).
Proof. Forward direction: let π be a policy such that π(s) = a. Then starting in state s, state s′ is
reached and then the state visitation frequency vector fπs′ is produced. Repeat for all such π ∈ Π.
Backward direction: lemma 21 shows that F(s′) contains at least one visitation distribution unique
to s′, which is available even under restriction to π(s) = a because any policy maximizing s′-
visitation would navigate to s′ immediately from s. Then this visitation distribution can only be
provided by s′ being reachable in one step from s.
Lemma 23. Suppose π traverses a k-cycle with states c1, . . . , ck. Define f
′ :=
∑k−1
i=0 γ
i
eci+1 . Then
f
π
c1
= 11−γk f
′, and for any ci, f
π
ci
= (Tπ)
k
f
π
ci
.
Proof. Since the ci form a k-cycle, f
π
c1
=
∑∞
i=0(γ
k)if ′ = 1
1−γk
f
′. Since the rewardless MDP is
deterministic and by the definition of a k-cycle, (Tπ)
k
acts as the identity on all fπci .
Lemma 24 (Convergence to gain optimality [15]). Let R be a reward function, s be a state, and
Scyc contain the states of a cycle with maximal average R-reward that is reachable from s. Then
lim
γ→1
(1− γ)V ∗R(s, γ) =
∑
c∈Scyc
R(c)∣∣Scyc∣∣ . (3)
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Lemma 25. V ∗R(s) is piecewise linear with respect to R; in particular, it is continuous.
Proof. V ∗R(s) = maxf∈F(s) f
⊤
r takes the maximum over a set of fixed |S|-dimensional linear
functionals. Therefore, the maximum is piecewise linear.
C.1 Non-dominated visitation distributions
Some visitation distributions are “redundant” – no goal’s optimal value is affected by their avail-
ability. If chocolate and bananas both have scalar reward, it’s never strictly optimal to take half of
each.
Definition. f is dominated if ∀r ∈ R|S| : maxf ′∈F(s) f
′⊤
r = maxf ′∈F(s)\{f} f
′⊤
r. The set of
non-dominated visitation distributions at state s is notated Fnd(s).
While Regan and Boutilier [16] consider a visitation distribution to be non-dominated if it is optimal
for some reward function, we consider it to be non-dominated if it is strictly optimal for some reward
function.
Definition. The non-dominated subgraph at s consists of those states visited and actions taken under
some non-dominated visitation distribution f ∈ Fnd(s).
1 2
(a) K2
1 2
3
(b)K3
1
2 3 4
5
(c)
Figure 11: Non-dominated subgraphs; the initial state s is blue, while actions only taken under
dominated visitation distributions are gray. In (a), F( 1 ) =


(
1
1−γ
0
)
,
(
1
γ
1−γ
)
,
(
1
1−γ2
γ
1−γ2
)
. The
third visitation distribution is not strictly optimal for any reward function. That is, ¬∃r : r11−γ2 +
γr2
1−γ2 > max
(
r1
1−γ , r1 +
γr2
1−γ
)
.
Proposition 26 (Domination criterion). f ∈ F(s) is dominated iff the inequality f⊤r >
maxf ′∈F(s)\{f} f
′⊤
r has no solution for r.
Lemma 27. The set of reward functions for which f is optimal is a pointed convex cone. If f is
non-dominated, µ(f , γ) > 0.
Proof. The set is convex because it is the intersection of half-spaces (f⊤r ≥ maxf ′∈Fnd(s)\{f} f
′⊤
r).
The set is a pointed cone because for any α ≥ 0, f⊤r ≥ maxf ′∈Fnd(s)\{f} f
′⊤
r implies f⊤(αr) ≥
maxf ′∈Fnd(s)\{f} f
′⊤(αr). If f is non-dominated, this set has positive measure because V ∗R(s) is
continuous onR by lemma 25.
Lemma 28 (Strict visitation optimality sufficient for non-domination). If f assigns more visitation
frequency to some state s′ than does any other f ′ ∈ F(s), then f ∈ Fnd(s). If there are several f
which maximize s′-visitation frequency, then at least one of them is non-dominated.
Proof. Let r be the state indicator reward function for s′.
Corollary 29. Suppose f1, . . . , fk ∈ F(s) which place strictly greater measure on some corre-
sponding states s1, . . . , sk than do other visitation distributions. Then f1, . . . , fk ∈ Fnd(s) and∣∣Fnd(s)∣∣ ≥ k. In particular, when ∣∣F(s)∣∣ ≤ 2, F(s) = Fnd(s).
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Proof. Apply lemma 28. For the second claim, observe thatF(s) = Fnd(s) trivially when
∣∣F(s)∣∣ =
1, and also holds for
∣∣F(s)∣∣ = 2 since of two distinct visitation distributions, each must have strict
visitation optimality for at least one state.
C.2 Variational divergence


1
γ
γ2
γ3
1−γ




0
0
0
1
1−γ


Figure 12: On-policy dTV along a path.
Lemma 30. Suppose π travels a path from state s1 for ℓ steps, ending in sℓ+1. dTV
(
f
π
s1
‖ fπsℓ+1
)
=
1−γℓ
1−γ .
Proof. Notice that each si loses γ
i−1 measure, and that all such states are distinct by the definition
of a path. Since all visitation distributions have equal norm, the total measure lost equals the total
measure gained by other states (and therefore the total variational divergence; see fig. 12). Then
dTV
(
f
π
s1
‖ fπsℓ+1
)
=
∑ℓ−1
i=0 γ
i = 1−γ
ℓ
1−γ .
s1


1
γ
...
γj−2
γj−1
γj
...
γk−1


s2 sj−1
sj


γk−j+1
γk−j+2
...
γk−1
1
γ
...
γk−j


sj+1sk
Figure 13: On-policy dTV along a cycle, with visitation distributions respectively corresponding to
s1 and sj . Factors of
1
1−γk
left out to avoid clutter.
Intuition suggests that a visitation distribution is most different from itself halfway along a cycle.
Lemma 31. Suppose π travels a k-cycle (k > 1) from state s1.
max
j∈[k]
dTV
(
f
π
s1
‖ fπsj
)
≤
1− γ
k
2
(1− γ)(1 + γ
k
2 )
<
1− γ
k
2
1− γ
. (4)
Proof.
dTV
(
f
π
s1
‖ fπsj
)
=
j−1∑
i=0
γi − γk−i−1 (5)
=
1− γj
1− γ
·
1− γk−j
1− γk
(6)
=
1− γj + γk − γk−j
(1 − γ)(1− γk)
. (7)
Equation (5) can be verified by inspection. Setting the derivative with respect to j to 0, we solve
0 = −γj + γk−j (8)
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j =
k
2
. (9)
This is justified because the function is strictly concave on j ∈ [0, k] by the second-order test and
the fact that γ ∈ (0, 1). If k is even, we are done. If k is odd, then we need an integer solution.
Notice that plugging j = ⌊k2 ⌋ and ⌈
k
2⌉ into eq. (6) yields the same maximal result.
Therefore, in the odd case, both inequalities in the theorem statement are strict. In the even case, the
first inequality is an equality.
Proposition 32 (Self-divergence lower bound for different states). For any π, if s 6= s′,
dTV
(
f
π
s ‖ f
π
s′
)
≥ 11+γ ≥
1
2 .
Proof. The shortest path self-divergence is when ℓ = 1 for lemma 30, in which case dTV
(
f
π
s ‖ f
π
s′
)
=
1. The shortest cycle self-divergence is when j = 1, k = 2 for lemma 31, in which case
dTV
(
f
π
s ‖ f
π
s′
)
= 11+γ < 1.
C.3 Optimal value uniqueness
For this section only, let R be any continuous (not necessarily bounded) distribution over reward
functions.
Theorem 33 (Optimal value differs everywhere for almost all reward functions). If s 6= s′, then
P(V ∗R(s) = V
∗
R(s
′) |R ∼ R) = 0.
Proof. Let R ∈ R and choose any π∗ for R. Clearly, V ∗R(s) = V
∗
R(s
′) iff fπ
∗⊤
s r = f
π∗⊤
s′ r. By
proposition 32, fπ
∗
s 6= f
π∗
s′ , so the set of r such that f
π∗⊤
s r = f
π∗⊤
s′ r is convex but has no interior.
Therefore, it has zero Lesbesguemeasure. SinceR is continuous, this subset has zero measure under
R by the Radon-Nikodym theorem.
Continuity is required for theorem 33 if reward is i.i.d. – discontinuousD admit non-zero probability
of drawing a flat reward function (for which optimal value is the same everywhere).
No f is suboptimal for all reward functions: every visitation distribution is optimal for a constant
reward function. However, for any given γ, almost every reward function has a unique optimal
visitation distribution at each state.
Theorem 34 (Optimal visitation distributions are almost always unique). Let s be any state. For
any γ ∈ (0, 1),
{
R ∈ R |
∣∣∣argmaxf∈F(s) f⊤r∣∣∣ > 1
}
has measure zero.
Proof. Let R ∈ R and let s be a state at which there is more than one optimal visitation distribution.
There exists a state s′ reachable from s with s1 6= s2 both one-step reachable from s
′ such that
V ∗R(s1) = V
∗
R(s2) (if not, then one or the other would be strictly preferable and only one optimal
visitation distribution would exist). Apply theorem 33.
Corollary 35 (Dominated visitation distributions almost never optimal). Let f be a dominated visi-
tation distribution at state s, and let γ ∈ (0, 1). µ(f , γ) = 0.
Lemma 27 states that each element of Fnd(s) is strictly optimal on a convex positive measure subset
of R. Theorem 34 further shows that these positive measure subsets cumulatively have 1 measure
under continuous distributions R. In particular, if a dominated visitation distribution is optimal, it
must be optimal on the boundary of several non-dominated convex subsets (otherwise it would be
strictly dominated).
Lemma 36 (Average reward of different state subsets almost never equal). Let S, S′ ⊆ S s.t. S 6= S′.
Then P
(∑
s∈S R(s)
|S|
=
∑
s′∈S′ R(s
′)
|S′|
∣∣∣∣ R ∼ R
)
= 0.
Proof. There are uncountably many unsatisfactory variants of every reward function which does sat-
isfy the equality; since R is continuous, the set of satisfactory reward functions must have measure
zero.
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C.4 Power
Definition. Let f ∈ F(s), γ ∈ (0, 1). opt(f , γ) denotes the subset ofR for which f is optimal.
Lemma 37. V ∗avg (s, γ) =
∑
f∈Fnd(s)
∫
opt(f ,γ)
f
⊤
rdF (r).
Proof. By the definition of domination, restriction to non-dominated visitation distributions leaves
all attainable utilities unchanged; D is continuous, so a zero measure subset of R has multiple
optimal visitation distributions (theorem 34).
1 2
3
Figure 14
opt(f , γ) can be calculated by solving the relevant system of
∣∣Fnd(s)∣∣ − 1
inequalities.1For example, consider the MDP of fig. 14. We would like to
calculate opt(f top, γ) to determine V ∗avg
(
1 , γ
)
.
f
top⊤
r ≥ f bottom⊤r
r1 +
γr2
1− γ
≥ r1 +
γr3
1− γ
,
so r2 ≥ r3. Intersecting this halfspace with [0, 1]
|S|, we have opt(f top, γ).
Lemma 1 (Minimal power). |F(s)| = 1 iff POWER(s, γ) = E [D].
Proof. Forward direction: let f be the sole visitation distribution at s. Then themax of V ∗avg (s, γ) is
trivial, so V ∗avg (s, γ) = E [D]
1
1−γ by the linearity of expectation.
Backward direction: for any rewardless MDP, iteratively construct it, starting such that
∣∣F(s)∣∣ = 1
and adding vertices and their arrows. Note that
∣∣F(s)∣∣ and POWER(s, γ) monotonically increase
throughout this process (the latter due to max). In particular, if
∣∣F(s)∣∣ increases from 1, by corol-
lary 29 there exists a second non-dominated visitation distribution. By lemma 27, a positive measure
subset of R accrues strictly greater optimal value via this visitation distribution. So the integration
comes out strictly greater. Then if
∣∣F(s)∣∣ > 1, POWER(s, γ) > E [D].
Lemma 2 (Maximal power). Suppose that s can reach all states in one step, and that all states have
self-loops. POWER(s, γ) = E
[
max of |S| draws from D
]
. In particular, for any rewardless MDP
with |S| states, this POWER(s, γ) is maximal.
Proof. Each visitation distribution which immediately navigates to a state and stays there is non-
dominated by lemma 28; these are also the only non-dominated visitation distributions, because the
agent cannot do better than immediately navigating to the highest reward state and staying there. So∣∣Fnd(s)∣∣ = |S|.
Clearly, the visitation distribution navigating to a child is optimal iff the child is a maximum-reward
state for a given reward function.
POWER(s, γ) =
∫ 1
0
rmax dFmax(rmax) (10)
= E
[
max of |S| draws from D
]
. (11)
Proposition 3 (Smoothness across reversible dynamics). Suppose s and s′ can both reach each
other in one step. Then
∣∣POWER(s, γ)− POWER(s′, γ)∣∣ ≤ 1−γ
γ
.
Proof. Anonymous [1] prove that
∫
R
∣∣∣V ∗R (s)− V ∗R (s′)∣∣∣ dF (R) ≤ 1 (theorem 2) under these as-
sumptions, and that
∣∣∣V ∗avg (s, γ)− V ∗avg (s′, γ)∣∣∣ ≤ ∫R
∣∣∣V ∗R (s)− V ∗R (s′)∣∣∣dF (R) (theorem 3) in gen-
eral. Combining these results, we have
1Mathematica code to calculate these inequalities can be found at https://github.com/loganriggs/gold.
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∣∣∣V ∗avg (s, γ)− V ∗avg (s′, γ)∣∣∣ ≤ 1 (12)∣∣∣∣(V ∗avg (s, γ)− E [D])− (V ∗avg (s′, γ)− E [D])
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1 (13)
1− γ
γ
∣∣∣∣(V ∗avg (s, γ)− E [D])− (V ∗avg (s′, γ)− E [D])
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1− γγ (14)∣∣POWER(s, γ)− POWER(s′, γ)∣∣ ≤ 1− γ
γ
. (15)
Proposition 4 (Delay decreases power). Let s0, . . . , sℓ be such that for i = 0, . . . , ℓ − 1, each si
has si+1 as its sole child. Then POWER(s0, γ) =
(
1− γℓ
)
E [D] + γℓPOWER(sℓ, γ).
Proof.
V ∗avg (s0, γ) :=
∫
R
max
f∈F(s0)
V ∗R(s0) dF (R) (16)
=

ℓ−1∑
i=0
γi
∫ 1
0
R(si) dF (R)

+ γℓ ∫
R
max
f∈F(sℓ)
V ∗R(sℓ) dF (R) (17)
=
1− γℓ
1− γ
E [D] + γℓV ∗avg (sℓ, γ) . (18)
We then calculate POWER(s0, γ):
POWER(s0, γ) :=
1− γ
γ
(
1− γℓ
1− γ
E [D] + γℓV ∗avg (sℓ, γ)− E [D]
)
(19)
= (1− γ)
(
1− γℓ−1
1− γ
E [D] + γℓ−1V ∗avg (sℓ, γ)
)
(20)
= (1− γ)
(
1− γℓ−1
1− γ
E [D] + γℓ−1
(
γ
1− γ
POWER(sℓ, γ) + E [D]
))
(21)
= (1− γℓ−1)E [D] + γℓPOWER(sℓ, γ) + γ
ℓ−1(1− γ)E [D] (22)
=
(
1− γℓ
)
E [D] + γℓPOWER(sℓ, γ). (23)
Lemma 38. For states s and s′, there exists a permutation matrix P such that F
(
s′
)
={
Pf | f ∈ F(s)
}
iff s and s′ are similar.
Proof. Forward: let φ be the permutation corresponding to P; without loss of generality, assume φ
is the identity on all states not reachable from either s or s′. Observe that φ(s) = s′ and φ(s′) = s.
If φwere not an automorphism, one of the visitation distributions would be different, as the one-step
reachabilities of a state reachable from s or s′ would differ.
Backward: suppose s and s′ are similar under automorphism φ. Then each visitation distribution
fs following s . . . sℓsℓ+1 . . . sℓ+k corresponds to fs′ following φ (s) . . . φ (sℓ)φ (sℓ+1) . . . φ (sℓ+k),
since automorphisms preserve graph structure. Clearly the conclusion follows.
Proposition 5. If s and s′ are similar, they have equal POWER.
Proof. By lemma 38, there exists a permutation matrix P such that Fnd
(
s′
)
=
{
Pf | f ∈ Fnd(s)
}
.
Then the integration of V ∗avg
(
s′, γ
)
merely relabels the variables being integrated in V ∗avg (s, γ).
Corollary 6. If the model is vertex transitive, all states have equal POWER.
Corollary 7. If s and s′ have the same children, they have equal POWER.
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C.4.1 Time uniformity
Theorem 8 (Time-uniform power). If s is time-uniform, then either all visitation distributions si-
multaneously enter 1-cycles or no visitation distribution ever enters a 1-cycle. Furthermore,
POWER(s, γ) = UNIFPOWER(s, γ) := (1 − γ)
∞∑
t=1
γt−1E
[
max of
∣∣REACH(s, t)∣∣ draws from D] .
Proof. Suppose s is time-uniform, and the first visitation distribution to enter a 1-cycle does so
after k > 0 timesteps. Then by the definition of time-uniformity, all other visitation distributions
must enter 1-cycles. Then the formula follows because at each time step t ≤ k − 2, an agent
maximizing any given reward function can choose the child with highest reward without impinging
on the availability of future choices. This agent then stays in the highest-reward terminal state, which
is chosen to be the best of
∣∣REACH(s, t)∣∣ options.
If no 1-cycles are ever entered, then ∀t ≥ 0, all visitation distributions can reach the same children
at step t (by definition of time-uniformity). Then the formula once again follows.
Proposition 9.
0 < E [D] ≤ POWER(s, γ) ≤ UNIFPOWER(s, γ) ≤ E
[
max of |S| draws from D
]
< 1.
Proof. POWER(s, γ) ≤ UNIFPOWER(s, γ) because, for each reward function and at each time step
t, the agent can at best choose the highest-reward state from REACH(s, t). The other inequalities
follow directly from lemma 1 and lemma 2.
C.5 Optimal policy shifts
Lemma 39. Fix R ∈ R. Suppose an optimal policy shift occurs at γ from optimal policy set Π∗< to
Π∗>. Then Π
∗
< ∪ Π
∗
> ⊆ Π
∗
γ; in particular, at discount rate γ, there exists a state with at least two
optimal visitation distributions.
Proof. Since an optimal policy shift occurs at γ, ∀π∗<, π
∗
>, s :
(
f
π∗<
s,γ − f
π∗>
s,γ
)⊤
r = 0.
0 −.25 1 −1 0
Figure 15: In lemma 39, Π∗< can equal Π
∗
>. In this MDP (with rewards shown in green below each
state), the left-right shortcut is optimal for all values of γ. An optimal policy shift occurs at γ = .5;
here, Π∗< ∪ Π
∗
> ( Π
∗
γ .
Corollary 40 (Almost all reward functions don’t shift at any given γ). Let γ ∈ (0, 1). The subset of
R with an optimal policy shift occurring at γ has measure zero.
Proof. Combine lemma 39 with the fact that at any given γ, almost all of R has a unique optimal
visitation distribution (theorem 34).
The intuition for the following proof is that shifts require choices to be made regarding which states
are reachable at the second time step, and either a reachable state that isn’t reachable in one step, or
the inability to either simply stay at the highest reward state or to chain the highest initial reward
into the next-best visitation distribution. Recall that s′ ∈ Ch(s) means that ∃a : T (s, a) = s′.
Theorem 10 (Existence of optimal policy shifts). There can exist a reward function whose opti-
mal policy at s0 changes with γ iff ∃s1, s
′
1 ∈ Ch(s0), s
′
2 ∈ Ch(s
′
1) \ Ch(s1) : s
′
2 6∈ Ch(s0) ∨(
s1 6∈ Ch(s1) ∧ s
′
1 6∈ Ch(s1)
)
.
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Proof. Forward: without loss of generality, suppose the optimal policy of some R is shifting for the
first time (a finite number of shifts occur by theorem 12, which does not depend on this result).
Let f , f ′ induce state trajectories s0s1s2 . . . and s0s
′
1s
′
2 . . ., respectively, with the shift occur-
ring from an optimal visitation distribution set containing f to one containing f ′. s1 6=
s′1 because the optimal policy for s0 changes. If Ch(s1) = Ch(s
′
1), no shifts occur,
as the locally greedy policy cannot shift. Suppose without loss of generality that s′2 ∈
Ch(s′1); we then have s
′
2 6∈ Ch(s1) because otherwise no shift would occur. We show
the impossibility of ¬
(
s′2 6∈ Ch(s0) ∨
(
s1 6∈ Ch(s1) ∧ s
′
1 6∈ Ch(s1)
))
= s′2 ∈ Ch(s0) ∧(
s1 ∈ Ch(s1) ∨ s
′
1 ∈ Ch(s1)
)
.
Suppose first that s′2 ∈ Ch(s0) ∧ s1 ∈ Ch(s1) ∧ s
′
1 ∈ Ch(s
′
1). Then if s0 can reach a state, it can
do so immediately, and then stay there indefinitely (as s1, s
′
1 ∈ Ch(s0) were arbitrary, so it can stay
indefinitely at all immediate children). So clearly the policy of moving to the highest-reward state
never shifts.
Suppose next that s′2 ∈ Ch(s0) ∧ s1 ∈ Ch(s1) ∧ s
′
1 6∈ Ch(s
′
1). This means that s
′
1 can-
not “act” as s1 (otherwise, it could reach itself by assumption), so ¬∃sa, sb :
(
sa ∈ Ch(sa)
)
∧(
sb ∈ Ch(sa) \ Ch(s
′
1)
)
. Therefore, ∀s1 ∈ Ch(s0) : s1 ∈ Ch(s1) → Ch(s1) ⊆ Ch(s
′
1). In
other words, any state s′1 which cannot immediately reach itself is able to immediately reach all
self-reaching states.
Since s1 was the greedy choice, it must be a self-reaching state with maximal reward under R. But
for a shift to occur, there must be some state visited by f ′ with reward greater than s1; since s0 can
immediately reach all reachable states, this state would have been greedy over s1. Let this state be
the new s1. But this state cannot reach itself, contradicting the assumption that s1 ∈ Ch(s1).
Suppose instead that s′2 ∈ Ch(s0) ∧ s
′
1 ∈ Ch(s1). Then no shift can occur, because if f
′⊤
r > f⊤r,
then
r1 + γf
′⊤
r > f ′⊤r (24)
r1 > (1− γ)f
′⊤
r. (25)
s0 can immediately reach all reachable states, and s1 has maximal reward amongst them (as s1 is
the greedy choice). If all states visited by f ′ have equal reward to R(s1), then equality holds above;
but in this case, no shift would occur. Then the strict inequality must hold above.
Backward: if s′2 6∈ Ch(s0), then s
′
2 6= s1 (as s1 ∈ Ch(s0)); let R(s1) := .1, R(s
′
2) = 1, and 0
elsewhere; a shift from s0s1s2 . . . to s0s
′
1s
′
2 . . . occurs because s1 cannot immediately reach s
′
2, and
the greater reward of s′2 must be delayed by one time step (the link displays the latest possible shift
given the MDP structure).
If s′2 ∈ Ch(s0), then setR(s1) = 1,R(s
′
1) = .99,R(s
′
2) = .9, and 0 elsewhere. A shift occurs from
immediate reward to greater discounted return (note that s1 6∈ Ch(s1), so it takes at least two steps
to reach itself, and it similarly takes at least two steps to reach s′1 or s
′
2). Specifically, by comparing
the best case for s1 (it can reach itself in two steps) and the worst case for s
′
1, s
′
2 (no more reward is
available after s′2), we have
1
1−γ2 < .99+ .9γ. A shift occurs even in this case, so we are done.
Lemma 41. Let f , f ′ ∈ F(s1) and let R be a reward function.
(
f − f ′
)⊤
r has γ as a factor.
Proof. Suppose f induces a path of length ℓ and a cycle of length k; similarly for f ′ (with respect to
ℓ′ and k′). Consider that the term relating to r1 (the starting state s1) is the only term which is not
some power of γ.
Suppose ℓ = ℓ′ = 0. If k = k′, then the term is 0 and we can pull out γ from the rest of the equation.
Otherwise we can pull out a factor of γmin(k,k
′) (and k, k′ ≥ 1):
r1
(
1
1− γk
−
1
1− γk′
)
= r1
(
γk − γk
′(
1− γk
) (
1− γk′
)
)
. (26)
Suppose ℓ, ℓ′ ≥ 1; the term is also then 0. Lastly, suppose ℓ = 0 and ℓ′ ≥ 1. Then r1
(
1
1−γk − 1
)
=
r1
γk
1−γk
; we can still pull out a factor of γ.
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Lemma 11. For any reward functionR and f , f ′ ∈ F(s), f and f ′ switch off at most 2 |S|− 2 times.
Proof. Consider that f⊤r =
∑ℓ
i=1 γ
i−1ri +
∑ℓ+k
j=ℓ+1
γj−1
1−γk
rj and f
′⊤
r =
∑ℓ′
i′=1 γ
i′−1ri′ +∑ℓ′+k′
j=ℓ′+1
γj
′−1
1−γk′
rj . By the sum rule for fractions, their difference produces a polynomial of degree
at mostmax(ℓ, ℓ′)+k+k′− 1 (reduced tomax(ℓ, ℓ′)+k− 1 if k = k′). The fundamental theorem
of algebra dictates that the degree upper-bounds how many roots exist in (0, 1). But by lemma 41,
at least one of the roots is at γ = 0.
Theorem 12 (Existence of a Blackwell optimal policy [3]). For any reward function R, a finite
number of optimal policy shifts occur.
A Blackwell R-optimal visitation distribution is a visitation distribution induced by a Blackwell
R-optimal policy.
Proposition 13. The following limits exist: POWER(s, 1) := limγ→1 POWER(s, γ) and µ(f , 1) :=
limγ→1 µ(f , γ). Similarly for POWER(s, 0) and µ(f , 0).
Proof. We show that, for any ǫ > 0 there exists γ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all R ∈ R (with f∗ a
Blackwell R-optimal visitation distribution whose existence is guaranteed by theorem 12),
(1− γ)
∣∣∣∣f⊤γ r− limγ∗→1 f∗⊤γ∗ r
∣∣∣∣ < ǫ. (27)
We split the inequality into two parts: the difference between (1− γ)f⊤γ r and (1− γ)f
∗⊤
γ r, and the
difference between (1− γ)f∗⊤γ r and the limit average cyclic reward (lemma 24).
First notice that the longer the paths, the greater the discrepancy can be between average rewards of
the cycles due to discounting. By lemma 20, the longest path has length |S| − 1; suppose both f
and f∗ have paths of this length. Without loss of generality, ignore the fact that there cannot be two
disjoint paths of this length, even though the following inequalities imply it.
We first bound (1−γ)
∣∣∣∣(fγ − f∗γ)⊤ r
∣∣∣∣ < ǫ2 . By the triangle inequality, we can show this by showing
ǫ
4 -closeness for both the path and cycle differences. The greatest path difference is
(1− γ)(1− 0)
1− γ|S|−1
1− γ
<
ǫ
4
(28)
γ > |S|−1
√
1−
ǫ
4
. (29)
Suppose f is not yet Blackwell R-optimal; then the discounted advantage δ of switching to the R-
optimal visitation distribution’s cycle must be outweighed by the disadvantage of the path reward
(otherwise the switch would have already occurred). We have
(1 − γ)γ|S|−1
δ
1− γ
<
ǫ
4
(30)
δ <
ǫ
4γ|S|−1
. (31)
Note that when D is uniform, there is at most 2δ < ǫ
2γ|S|−1
measure of R satisfying this inequality
(if the inequality is not satisfied, then f = f∗ is Blackwell optimal and the absolute difference for
this half of the bound is zero). For continuous D in general, this measure vanishes by continuity.
Therefore, limγ→1 µ(f , γ) exists.
We now bound the second difference. Observe that 1 ≥ maxs rs. There are no path returns for the
limit case, so the maximum path return difference is bounded:
(1 − γ)
ℓ∑
i=1
γi−1 |ri| ≤ 1− γ
ℓ (32)
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<
ǫ
4
. (33)
Setting 1 > γ > |S|−1
√
1− ǫ4 satisfies both eq. (33) and eq. (29). Now we consider the absolute
difference of cycle returns:∣∣∣∣∣∣
ℓ+k∑
i=ℓ+1
(
γi−1(1− γ)
1− γk
−
1
k
)
ri
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
|S|∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(
γi−1(1 − γ)
1− γ|S|
−
1
|S|
)
ri
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (34)
<
ǫ
4
. (35)
We then ensure each term of the RHS of eq. (34) is less than ǫ4|S| . Note that ∀γ ∈ (0, 1) :
1−γ
1−γ|S|
≥
1
|S| ; therefore, the maximum value of i in the following equation is either 1 or |S|:
max
1≤i≤|S|
∣∣∣∣∣γ
i−1(1− γ)
1− γ|S|
−
1
|S|
∣∣∣∣∣ < ǫ4|S| . (36)
For i = |S|, γ|S| γ
i−1(1−γ)
1−γ|S|
< 1|S| , so
1
|S|
−
γ|S|−1(1− γ)
1− γ|S|
<
ǫ
4|S|
(37)
γ|S|−1(1− γ)
1− γ|S|
>
4− ǫ
4|S|
(38)
γ > |S|−1
√
1−
ǫ
4
. (39)
Clearly, the i = 1 case can also be satisfied. Then we can conclude there exists γ such that
POWER(s, γ) is ǫ-close to its limit value.
The proof for POWER(s, 0) and µ(f , 0) proceeds similarly.
Lemma 42 (Optimality measure doesn’t vanish). Let f ∈ Fnd(s). For all L ∈ [0, 1],
limγ→L µ(f , γ) 6= 0. In particular, visitation distributions are dominated iff they have µ(f , γ) = 0
for all γ ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. If L = 0, the conclusion follows as all non-dominated visitation distributions are optimal for
all reward functions, and measure is split evenly. If L ∈ (0, 1), then apply lemma 27.
If L = 1, this limit exists by proposition 13. If no other visitation distribution shares the cyclic states
of f , then there exists a positive measure subset of R for which f is strictly optimal by lemma 36
(that is, the set of reward functions for which the cycle of f has greatest average reward). If other
visitation distributions do share the cyclic states, then the measure is thus split evenly in the limit as
path reward becomes inconsequential (proposition 13). This limit measure split is non-zero, as there
are finitely many such visitation distributions.
C.6 Instrumental convergence
Definition. µ(si+1 | τ
i, γ) is the probability of choosing si+1 ∈ Ch(si) given that state trajectory
prefix τ i is optimal.
Lemma 43 (Factorization of optimality measure). Let f be a visitation distribution with path length
ℓ and cycle length k.
µ(f , γ) =
ℓ+k−1∏
i=0
µ(si+1 | τ
i, γ).
Lemma 44. There exists f ∈ Fnd(s) whose measure contains a factor varying with γ iff there exists
f
′ ∈ Fnd(s) whose measure varies with γ.
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Proof. Forward: for this not to be true, another dividing term would need to divide by a multiple of
the function on γ (since µ(f , γ) 6= 0). But the fact that a child has a variable distribution implies
that two or more visitation distribution completions have variable measure, and the dividing term
can only negate one of the possible completions.
The backwards direction follows from lemma 43.
Lemma 45. Fix f ∈ F(s) and consider γ ∈ [0, 1]. µ(f , γ) is continuous on γ.
Proof. For γ ∈ (0, 1), if not, there would exist a γ at which a positive measure subset of R shifts,
contradicting corollary 40. For γ ∈ {0, 1}, µ is continuous by definition (proposition 13).
Lemma 46. Fix f ∈ Fnd(s). ∀i ≥ 0, the distribution µ(si+1 | τ
i, γ) varies continuously with γ.
Proof. By lemma 43, µ(f , γ) factorizes. By lemma 45, µ(f , γ) is continuous on γ. Since µ(f , γ) 6= 0
by lemma 42, each factor must be continuous.
Lemma 47. If instrumental convergence exists downstream of some state s, then there exists f ∈
Fnd(s) such that µ(f , γ) varies with γ.
Proof. Suppose that instrumental convergence exists at s itself (if not, the proof can easily be
adapted to states downstream). We show that as γ → 0, µ(s1 | s, γ) approaches the uniform dis-
tribution over its children Ch(s); therefore, µ(f , γ) is variable. We do so by showing that the
measure of reward functions whose optimal policies do not act greedily at s approaches zero.
Suppose R is such that, although the greedy policy navigates to s′ ∈ Ch(s), its Blackwell optimal
policy chooses the non-greedy child s′′ ∈ Ch(s). Then let δ := r′ − r′′ > 0. We now lower-
bound the additional delayed return required so that the greedy policy is suboptimal. Without loss
of generality, suppose that after collecting the greedy reward r′, the agent is only able to receive the
minimal reward of 0 per timestep thereafter; similarly, suppose that after collecting the non-greedy
r′′, the agent receives the maximal 1 reward per timestep. Then we must have
r′ < r′′ +
γ
1− γ
(40)
δ <
γ
1− γ
. (41)
LetN be a positive integer such that 1
N
< γ. As we will be taking limγ→0, we may simplify:
δ <
1
N − 1
. (42)
Since N → ∞ as γ → 0, δ → 0. That is, as γ → 0, the greedy differential for which delayed grat-
ification is possible (even under maximally generous assumptions) approaches 0. Lastly, since D
is continuous, the measure of reward functions which have a δ-close greedy differential approaches
zero along with δ itself. Then µ(s1 | s, γ) approaches uniformity, varying from its initial distribu-
tion (since we assumed instrumental convergence at s). Then a visitation distribution has variable
measure by lemma 44.
Corollary 48. POWER(s, 0) = E
[
max of
∣∣Ch(s)∣∣ draws from D].
Lemma 49. Fix f ∈ Fnd(s). If µ(f , γ) varies with γ, then instrumental convergence exists down-
stream of s.
Proof. The fact that µ(f , γ) varies with γ implies that there exists some f ′ such that, for some k,
µ(sk | τ
′k, γ) varies with γ (lemma 44). Suppose µ(sk | τ
′k, γ) varies at γ′ ∈ (0, 1); by lemma 46,
this function is continuous in γ. Then there exists ǫ such that µ(sk | τ
′k, γ + ǫ) is non-uniform.
Theorem 14 (Characterization of instrumental convergence). Instrumental convergence exists down-
stream of a state iff a visitation distribution of that state has measure which is variable in γ.
Corollary 15. Instrumental convergence does not exist if optimal policy shifts cannot occur.
Corollary 16. Instrumental convergence does not exist for γ = 0.
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1Figure 16: Our ongoing assumption ofD’s continuity is required for theorem 14. Under the uniform
distribution on {0, 1}S, the visitation distribution going up from 1 has measure 1024 , while the
other two visitation distributions have measure 724 . However, under [0, 1]
S , the upwards visitation
distribution has measure 3−γ6 , while the other two each have measure
3+γ
12 (note that the different
distributions’ µ(f , γ) are equal at γ = 12 ). The right two visitation distributions are equally likely by
proposition 50.
1
Figure 17: Surprisingly, instrumental convergence can exist at 1 for some distributions, but not
for others. When D has CDF F (x) = x (uniform), µ(top) = µ(right) = 12 . When D has CDF
F (x) = x2, instrumental convergence exists: µ(right) = 10+3γ−3γ
2
20 . The convex combination of
two draws from D preserves the mean but decreases variance. This D has negative skew, so this can
result in an increased probability of greater return compared to the upper visitation distribution.
C.6.1 Visitation distribution similarity
Definition. Define POWERCONTRIB(f , γ) := 1−γ
γ
∫
opt(f ,γ)(f − es)
⊤
rdF (r) to be the con-
tribution of f ∈ F(s) to POWER(s, γ). For F ⊆ F(s), POWERCONTRIB(F, γ) :=∑
f∈F POWERCONTRIB(f , γ).
Definition. Let f , f ′ ∈ Fnd(s0) induce state trajectories s0s1s2 . . . and s0s
′
1s
′
2 . . . respectively. We
say that f and f ′ are similar if there exists a graph automorphism φ on the non-dominated subgraph
at s0 such that s0 = φ(s0), s1 = φ(s
′
1), s2 = φ(s
′
2), . . ..
1
Figure 18: The non-dominated subgraph at 1 , with dominated actions displayed in gray. All four
non-dominated visitation distributions are similar. Corollary 51 allows us to conclude the absence
of instrumental convergence, even though this is not obvious just from looking at the full model.
Proposition 50. If f and f ′ are similar, then µ(f , γ) = µ(f ′, γ) and POWERCONTRIB(f , γ) =
POWERCONTRIB(f ′, γ).
Proof. The existence of φ implies that the integrations for µ and POWERCONTRIB merely relabel
variables (see also the proof of proposition 5, which relates the visitation distributions at different
states instead of the visitation distributions at a fixed state).
Corollary 51. If all non-dominated visitation distributions of a state are similar, then no instrumen-
tal convergence exists downstream of that state.
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Observe that the existence of such an automorphism φ for the full model is sufficient for similar-
ity. Vertex transitivity does not necessarily imply that all visitation distributions are similar (e.g.
instrumental convergence exists in the 3-prism graph Y3 with self-loops).
C.6.2 Cycle reachability preservation
Theorem 17. If s can reach s′, then POWER(s, 1) ≥ POWER(s′, 1). The inequality is strict iff the
cycles reachable from s′ are a strict subset of the cycles reachable from s.
Proof. Suppose s can reach s′ and consider R ∈ R. Let Scyc contain the states of a cycle with
maximal average R-reward that is reachable from s′.
lim
γ→1
(1 − γ)V ∗R(s
′, γ) =
∑
c∈Scyc
R(c)∣∣Scyc∣∣ (43)
≤ lim
γ→1
(1− γ)V ∗R(s, γ). (44)
Equation (43) follows by lemma 24, and eq. (44) follows because s can also reach Scyc.
For the forward direction, if s′ can reach the same cycles as can s, then the maximal average cyclic
value remains unchanged for every R ∈ R. Conversely, if s′ has lost access to a cycle, then by
lemma 36 there exists a positive measure subset of R for which the cycle was strictly optimal. It
follows that POWER(s, 1) > POWER(s′, 1).
Suppose all f ∈ Fnd(s) terminate in 1-cycles. Let C contain all of the cycles reachable from s, and
let C1, C2 ⊆ C. Let FCi ⊆ Fnd(s) contain those non-dominated visitation distributions ending in a
cycle of Ci.
Lemma 18. µ(FCi , 1) =
|Ci|
|C|
.
Proof. Blackwell optimal policies must be gain-optimal (must have maximal average cyclic reward);
therefore, each reward function eventually ends up on the gain-optimal visitation distribution (which
is unique for almost every reward function by theorem 34). The probability of a given cycle being
gain-optimal for any reward function is 1|C| .
Theorem 19. LetK ≥ 1. If |C1| > K |C2|, then µ(FC1 , 1) > K · µ(FC2 , 1).
Corollary 52. POWERCONTRIB(FCi , 1) = E
[
max of |C| draws from D
] |Ci|
|C| .
Proof. Each gain-optimal policy selects the highest reward state from among |C| contenders.
By restricting to non-dominated visitation distributions (without loss of generality by lemma 42),
theorem 19 correctly predicts instrumental convergence in fig. 19.
1
2 3 4
5
Figure 19: 1 → 3 is instrumentally convergent, even though POWER( 2 , 1) > POWER( 3 , 1)
by theorem 17. The visitation distributions traveling 1 → 2 → 3 are both dominated. Then
theorem 19 entails that µ( 1 → 2 , 1) = 13 and µ( 1 → 3 , 1) =
2
3 . Furthermore, when calculat-
ing POWER with respect to the non-dominated subgraph induced from 1 , POWER and instrumental
convergence once again agree.
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Extension to k-cycles. Instrumental convergence results for k-cycles (k > 1) appear to depend on
choice of distributionD. However, even in the presence of these cycles, we can still draw qualitative
conclusions about instrumental convergence. For example, consider the game of Pac-Man; clearly,
cycles are possible in which Pac-Man loops around obstacles.
Informally, if a trajectory prefix is instrumentally convergent even when assuming that only 1-cycles
are available to that prefix, then that prefix remains instrumentally convergent in the full environment.
Therefore, we can still conclude that avoiding immediate death (a 1-cycle state) is instrumentally
convergent in Pac-Man.
Theorem 53. Let F, F ′ ⊆ F(s). Suppose that all visitation distributions of F ′ terminate in 1-cycles,
and that F contains visitation distributions whose cycles are disjoint from those of F ′. LetM ′ be a
subgraph in which F terminates in 1-cycles but the cycles of F ′ are left unchanged.
LetK ≥ 1. If µM ′(F, 1) > K · µM ′(F
′, 1), then µM (F, 1) > K · µM (F
′, 1).
Proof. Deleting edges from the cycles of F can only decrease optimality measure of F and increase
the measure of F ′. Therefore, µM (F, 1) ≥ µM ′(F, 1) and µM ′(F
′, 1) ≥ µM (F
′, 1).
C.6.3 Average control of a visitation distribution
Lemma 54. Let f ∈ Fnd(s) and γ ∈ [0, 1].
0 < E [D] ≤
POWERCONTRIB(f , γ)
µ(f , γ)
≤ UNIFPOWER(s, γ) ≤ E
[
max of |S| draws from D
]
< 1.
Proof. E [D] > 0 because D is continuous. Construct the MDP iteratively, starting such that∣∣F(s)∣∣ = 1. The minimum POWERCONTRIB(f ,γ)
µ(f ,γ) monotonically increases as the MDP is constructed
(giving the lower bound), and the best any visitation distribution can do for its opt(f) is to imme-
diately navigate to the highest-reward state of REACH(s, t) at each time step t (giving the upper
bound).
Theorem 55 (Power contribution and optimality measure are roughly proportional). Let F, F ′ ⊆
F(s), γ ∈ [0, 1], andK ≥ 1. Suppose that
POWERCONTRIB(F, γ) > K
UNIFPOWER(s, γ)
E [D]
POWERCONTRIB(F ′, γ).
Then µ(F, γ) > K ·µ(F ′, γ). The statement also holds when POWERCONTRIB and µ are exchanged.
Proof. Since D is continuous, F must contain at least one non-dominated visitation distribution
(else it would have 0 power by corollary 35, contradicting the strict inequality in the premise). Sup-
pose F ′ contains no non-dominated visitation distributions; then the conclusion follows trivially
(limγ→L µ(F
′, γ) = 0 by corollary 35).
Otherwise, consider the power contribution divided by its measure (which exists and is pos-
itive by lemma 42); we have UNIFPOWER(s, γ) ≥ limγ→L
POWERCONTRIB(F, γ)
µ(F, γ)
and
limγ→L
POWERCONTRIB(F ′, γ)
µ(F ′, γ)
≥ E [D] by lemma 54. These limits exist by proposition 13.
lim
γ→L
µ(F, γ) > lim
γ→L
POWERCONTRIB(F, γ)
UNIFPOWER(s, γ)
(45)
≥ K lim
γ→L
POWERCONTRIB(F ′, γ)
E [D]
(46)
≥ K lim
γ→L
µ(F ′, γ). (47)
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Remark. Note that 1 > UNIFPOWER(s, γ). Furthermore, theorem 55 can be extended to hold for
arbitrary continuous distributions over reward functions (e.g., if some states have greater expected
reward than others).
Definition. Suppose T (s, a) = s′, and let F := Fnd(s |π(s) = a), with F
′ := {γ−1(f − es) | f ∈
F} being the corresponding visitation distributions in s′ (by lemma 22: f = γf ′ + es). The power
induced at s′ from s, notated POWER(s′|F ′ , γ), calculates the POWER of s
′ while restricting F(s′)
to F ′. If Fnd(s
′) ⊆ F ′, then POWER(s′|F ′ , γ) = POWER(s
′, γ).
The next result roughly says that the average control of the visitation distributions navigating through
a child state must be at least as great as the induced power through that child state.
Theorem 56. Suppose T (s, a) = s′, and let F := Fnd(s |π(s) = a), F
′ := {γ−1(f − es) | f ∈ F}.
Then
POWERCONTRIB(F, γ)
µ(F, γ)
≥ γPOWER(s′|F ′ , γ) + (1 − γ)E [D], with equality if |Ch(s)| = 1
and strict inequality otherwise.
Proof.
POWERCONTRIB(F, γ)
µ(F, γ)
:=
1− γ
γ
∑
f∈F
∫
opt(f ,γ)(f − es)
⊤
rdF (r)∫
opt(f ,γ)
1 dF (r)
(48)
= (1− γ)
∑
f ′∈F ′
∫
opt(f ′,γ) f
′⊤
rdF (r)∫
opt(f ′,γ) 1 dF (r)
(49)
≥ (1− γ)V ∗avg
(
s′, γ
)
. (50)
Equation (49) follows by lemma 22: f = γf ′ + es. Equation (50) follows because if Fnd(s
′) ⊆ F ′,
then the denominator of eq. (49) equals 1, and eq. (49) equals eq. (50). Otherwise, strict inequality
holds as there exists f ∈ Fnd(s) such that f 6∈ F which is strictly optimal for a positive measure
subset of R, so removing this visitation distribution from consideration strictly decreases average
optimal return.
Then
POWERCONTRIB(F, γ)
µ(F, γ)
≥ γPOWER(s′|F ′ , γ) + (1 − γ)E [D] follows through algebraic ma-
nipulation and the definition of POWER.
Corollary 57 (Minimal successor power bound).
POWER(s, γ) ≥ min
s′∈Ch(s)
γPOWER(s′|F ′ , γ) + (1− γ)E [D] .
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